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TEACHER NEGOTIATIONS INTO THE SEVENTIES
RALPiI P. DUPONT* AND ROBERT D. TOBIN**
INTRODUCTION
Violence Ahead?
Public school teachers stand at the threshold of the second five years
of statutorily mandated collective negotiations with their local boards
of education.' The results thus far have been less than satisfactory 2
*A.B., Brown University, 1951; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1956. Member of the
firm: Dupont, Pavetti & Dupont, New London, Connecticut.
" A.B., Boston College, 1964; J.D., Boston College Law School, 1968. Member of
the firm: Dupont, Pavetti & Dupont, New London, Connecticut.
1. For a complete summary with fall text of most state negotiation statutes see'D.
Wor-rir & R. CHANiN, Tm LAW AND PRACTICE Or TACntR NEGomlAioNs, appendix
(1970).
2. From September, 1967 to approximately October, 1970, in Connecticut alone,
there have been 26 teacher strikes, chiefly by National Education Association affiliates.
There were three such strikes in 1967, four in 1968, nine in 1969, and ten in 1970.
See CoNNEctr EDUCATION AssocIATIoN, CONNEcrmcur TEAcHER SnrUFs SINcE 1965
(A publication of the Connecticut Education Association). One major study states:
The strike is the most dramatic form of concerted activity used by teachers
in attempting to generate pressure against school boards, and the frequency
of strikes in public education is rapidly increasing. In 1959, there were four
work stoppages in public schools involving 220 employees with a loss of
440 man-days. These figures rose in 1960 to five strikes involving 10,200
employees with a loss of 17,000 man-days. By 1967 the number of work
stoppages in public schools had risen to 89 involving 96,200 workers at a
cost of 983,000 idle man-days. Complete figures for 1968 are not yet avail-
able. However, there were school strikes in many areas, e.g., Albuquerque,
N.M.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; Montgomery County, Md.; New Haven and Water-
bury, Conn.; San Francisco, Calif.; and New York City. The New York
City strike alone involved a loss of about two and one-half million man-days.
D. Wou.mr & R. CHAmN, supra note 1, at 6:81.
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and, therefore, disruption of school routine will not abate. What
emerges today is a picture of increasing teacher militancy against grow-
ing obdurateness respecting so-called "board prerogatives" 3 on the
part of certain of those charged with school administration, who either
cannot, or will not, understand the need for, and the purpose of, collec-
tive negotiations with teachers.
Regrettable as it may be, school boards and teachers are now surely
headed for violent disruption of essential educational services, unless
the course of the past five years is dramatically and immediately re-
versed4 without the delays that now appear to be a virtual prelude to
legislative action. Immediate congressional action is needed curbing
3. See, e.g, W. VAUSE, NEo-nAnoNs: A GUmE FOR SCHOOL MANAGEMENr 12-14 (1971)
where the author advises school board members -as follows:
Generally, teacher organizations have given the term "conditions of em-
ployment" an extremely broad meaning, while boards of education have
tried to restrict that term to preserve their management prerogatives and
policy-making powers ...
The [Connecticut Association of Boards of Education] has taken the posi-
tion that "conditions of employment" can be properly interpreted to include
only those matters directly affecting teacher welfare. While there are
many nebulous areas that may overlap working conditions, boards should
not enter negotiations on matters that are predominately matters of educa-
tional policy, management prerogative, or statutory duties of the board
of education.
. . . Examples of educational policy matters are the question as to what
extracurricular activities should be sponsored or supported, curriculum,
class size, and types of specialists to be employed by the system.
. . . Management prerogatives usually include the rights to schedule work,
to maintain order and efficiency, to hire, etc. Among the most highly con-
troversial areas are transfers and assignments. A board of education loses
control over important management functions if it surrenders by contract
exclusive decision making power on these matters.
Statutory duties are those duties and responsibilities that the General Assem-
bly has determined are most properly discharged by the representative pub-
lic body-the board of education. For example, boards of education have the
statutory duty to select textbooks and to determine curriculum.
Compare D. WOLLETT. & R. CHAiN, supra note 1, at 6:34-6:42.
4. Even as this article is written, Newark school teachers concluded a strike of
almost two months' duration, in which physical violence was said to have occurred,
and as of April 1, 1971, radio news bulletins claimed that the presiding judge had
signed secret bench warrants for the arrest of certain picketing school teachers.
Associated Press reports indicated that two mediators had resigned when their recom-




the abuses uncovered by past failures while preserving the more salutary
reforms.5
Unfortunately, however, vigorous attempts are being made to weaken
the infant teacher organizations by methods rarely found, and never
countenanced, in the private sector6 since the passage of Norris-La-
Guardia7 and Landrum-Grifin.8 Not surprisingly, therefore, it'is hard
to resist analogies between militancy in the civil rights movement and
student activism and the teacher effort to win respect at the bargaining
table in contract determination procedures.9
Even the most timid teachers have, wherever possible, cast off the
old garments of "collective begging" or "organized supplication" for
the raiments of collective negotiations (in a professional context). But
when the hard won new rights prove to be less than the teachers' ex-
pectations, or when these rights are watered-down by ineffective or
non-existent administration, and when school board members and the
school executives are prodded toward extreme assertions of management
prerogatives (in a business context),1" the entire process tends to dis-
integrate into a morass of collective frustration. The resulting impasse
procedures, mediation, arbitration (non-binding), or fact finding con-
ducted in many cases accomplish little" at a great expense.'2 The
5. Legislation was advanced by the National Education Association as S. 1951 and
H.R. 12-484, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
6. With few exceptions, school boards persist in obtaining injunctive relief rather
than yield to teachers, even where, as in Newark, the mediator urges the board to
do so. See note 4 supra. See also D. Wou-rr & R. CHANIN, supra note 2, at 6:1-6:22.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 105-115 (1964).
8. ld. § 153 et seq. (1964).
9. See generally Oberer, The Future of Collective Bargaining in Public Employ-
nent, 20 LAB. L.J. 777, 778 (1969).
10. See CoNumEricur ASSOCIATIONS OF SCHOOL SupmNTuNDENrs. LOOK To Tm '70's at
10 (1970).
11. In Connecticut, the following figures reflect the contract disputes which ad-
vanced to mediation and arbitration..
Scbool Year Mediation Settled Tbrough Arbitration
Mediation
1965-66 16 11 5
1966-67 14 8 5
1967-68 22 16 6
1968-69 25 14 11
1969-70 38 15 22
Letter from Kenneth H. Lundy, Consultant, Teacher-Board Negotiations, Connecticut
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level of frustration can only continue to rise until the polarization of
the parties becomes total and violent disruption of school activities
ensues.
A critical examination, therefore, of the major areas of disagreement
between teacher organizations and boards of education is attempted in
this article and some solutions, tentative to be sure, are posed. To this
end we will discuss experiences in negotiations; impasse resolution, in-
cluding mediation, fact-finding or advisory arbitration; the teachers'
strike or work stoppage; the anti-teacher injunction and post injunction
problems. While we have tried to suggest, where possible, methods and
practices which we believe will be useful in ameliorating the difficulties
we apprehend, to resolve this problem there must ultimately be recog-
nition of co-determination of educational policy 8 and an enlightened
attitude on the part of school management toward contract terms in-
volving non-academic matters.
History of Teacher Negotiations
The history and present posture of the teacher drive to achieve col-
lective negotiations is too well known to require more than a cursory
summary.14 Simply stated, however, teachers form a significant portion
of the more than twelve million public employees now struggling for
recognition or commencing organization efforts.15 Some twenty-four
states have enacted some form of teacher bargaining statute.' 6 Teachers,
State Department of Education, to Attorney Ralph Dupont, April 6, 1971. See also
McKelvey, Fact Finding in Public Employee Disputes: Promise or Illusion?, 22 Im.
& LAB. REL. REv. 528 (1969).
12. In at least one case, in the author's experience, arbitration fees and costs, ex-
clusive of counsel fees, exceeded $10,000. Although the result in the particular case
included detailed findings and recommendations of three attorneys, two of whom had
had broad experience in private sector contract negotiations, the decision was not
implemented by the parties. Moreover, it is often claimed that contract arbitration,
by a single local in the private sector, may cost the local as much as $50,000. See also
Address by Irving Abranson, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1971 at 32, col. 5.
13. But see, e.g., Pope & Vause, Metamorphosis of Public School Management: Five
Acts in a Continuing Negotiations Scenario in Connecticut, 2 CoNN. L. REv. 285, 303-05,
318 (1970).
14. An excellent general history of the more significant developments, statutory
enactments, court decisions ard organizational activities is contained in D. WoLL=rr
& R. CHAN N, supra note 1.
15. See Werne, A Legal Guide To Labor Realtions In The Public Sector, in CoL-
m.acrnm BARGAINIG FOR PUBLIc EMPLOYEES 128 (PLI ed. 1968).
16. See note 1 supra.
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however, are often separated from their fellow public employees by
differentiating legislation 17 and court decisions.'8
The legislative enactments have occurred principally since 196419
and the opening salvo is said to have been President Kennedy's promul-
gation of Executive Order 10988 on January 17, 1962.20 For many
years prior to 1962, however, teachers often sought, and sometimes
won, court approval for local collective negotiation procedures which
were arrived at by agreement with the boards of education concerned.21
Indeed, recommended impasse procedures were written and imple-
mented in the early sixties with the assistance of state departments of
education acting in concert with representatives of teachers and school
board organizations. 2 Thereupon, attempts were promptly made at
collective negotiations. 2 This was especially true in Connecticut which
had already witnessed a major teacher strike in Norwalk in 1946. 24
The executive director of the Connecticut Association of Boards of
Education has described the setting in which teachers found themselves
in 1965:
Before the enactment of Public Act 298 (Conn. P.L. 298, 1965
Sess.) boards of education in Connecticut often dealt with teachers
in a fashion similar to parents supervising children .... Just as
17. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A-3, -5 (1965).
18. Cf., e.g., Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 280, 83
A.2d 482, 484 (1951).
19. States enacting such laws are Alaska, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin. See note 1 supra.
20. See Werne, supra note 15, at 128.
21. See, e.g., Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d
482 (1951) (a landmark case of this type).
22. See, e.g., CoNNEcTIcUT STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION WORKING REATIONs BETWEEMN
BoARDs OF EDUCATION AND TEAcHERs ORGANIZATIONS, BuI.ETN 85 (1962). See also, D.
WOLI.ETr & R. CHANIN, supra note 1, at 1:6-1:7.
23. D. WOLLErr & R. CuANIN, supra note 1, at 1:6-1:7.
24. In 1946 there was a dispute between the Norwalk Teachers Association and the
Board of Education respecting salaries. The Association represented two hundred and
ninety-eight of the three hundred teachers. Two hundred and thirty of the teachers
rejected the individual contracts offered and refused to return to work. After extended
negotiations in which the governor of Connecticut took part, a master contract was
reached which recognized the Association as the bargaining agent for all of its members,
defined working conditions, and set up a grievance procedure and salary schedule.
Thereafter, the teachers returned to work. See Norwalk Teachers',Ass'n v. Board of
Educ., 131 Conn. 269, 271, 83 A.2d 482 (1951).
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some parents view their role as benign sovereigns, some boards
determined salaries and other conditions of employment without
consultation with the staff, other than the superintendent.25
The constantly increasing number and intensity of teacher work
stoppages since 196626 and the deepening sense of teacher frustration
indicated thereby may be but slight indication of the extent to which
school management actually fails to meet even the minimal require-
ments of existing state laws and adheres to notions and attitudes which
simply refuse to yield to the present day needs of teachers. 2  These
needs include recognition of professional status, freedom from intoler-
able, bureaucratic rule-making (including selective enforcement of such
rules), and community acceptance of teacher pay scales commensurate
with the value of the service rendered the community.
Teachers should neither suffer from the erosion of an inflation not of
their making nor be denied a fair share of the annual growth in the
gross national product which they have done much to make possible.
On the other hand, the cities are faced with a tax base too narrow and
an allocation of responsibility, too great to provide essential services.
Although educational needs may not be first in the order of local budget
priority, it cannot be denied that education is a close second and that
25. Pope & Vase, supra note 13, at 287.
26. See note 2 supra.
27. Some indication of the backward-looking views of school managers can be found
in CoNNFcncuT AssociATIoNs OF SCHOOL SUP1ERINENDENTS, supra note 10, at 8:
Finally, the issues of school board-teacher negotiations: If school systems
are to innovate and respond at the local level of today's education and social
challenges, it is imperative that the inherent and reserve powers of the- State
with respect to public education and the delegated powers of the local
school board must not be assigned, through negotiations, to employees of
the public school system, no matter how competent and altruistic such em-
ployees may be.
The powers of our school boards, through negotiations, are continually
being whittled away, and the ability of school boards to respond flexibly
to the changing conditions of a modern society has become seriously limited
and retarded. The usefulness of the school board, as an instrument of state
and local responsibility, has become measurably diminished.
The confusion about what is and what is not negotiable between em-
ployer boards and employee teacher organizations must be eliminated. The
uncounted hours of controversy must be reduced so that the energies of both
parties may be devoted to the serious matters of planning and programming
to meet the direct needs of children.




improper budgetary priorities are partially to blame for the present
financial crisis.28 The parties must recognize their respective problems
and seek a full understanding of them.
The Militant Boardman
Whether due to lack of tax revenue or other causes, it will not be
denied that teacher militancy is now being vigorously countered by
school boards which turn with increasing frequency to regional or
state organizations of board members with paid staff and a budget
supported in large measure by contributions of public funds.29 The
teacher lobbyist may now be met by an equally militant board lobby-
ist,30 following the model of the labor unions and the associations of
employers. Both sides have access to seemingly tireless printers and
have commissioned a veritable deluge of bulletins and reports, designed
as much to boost morale as to inform.
To complete the picture of the parties' positions five years after the
passage of the first significant legislation in the field, it is necessary to
add that board members are apparently now convinced that they have a
legislative mandate to make educational policy; and that the exercise
of this mandate, in accordance with their conception of public interest
in education, is exclusively a board prerogative.8 1 Although it would
seem that these views are hardly conducive to a sound professional re-
lationship with teachers, who themselves claim a considerable expertise
28. See generally, Lindholm, Financing Public Education and the Property Tax,
29 AM. J. EcoN. & Soc. 33 (1970).
29. See, e.g., Pope & Vause, supra note 13 at 291. Connecticut Association of Boards
of Education, Inc., 1 NEGoT-ATONS No. 2 (Oct. 9, 1968) outlines the role of the Con-
necticut Association in negotiations:
CABE acts primarily as a catalyst in negotiations. Supporting services of
research and mediation consultation are established CABE services. CABE's
legal service is distinguishable from that offered by attorneys in private
practice or municipal attorneys. We prepare opinions concerning the in-
terpretation of statutes, cases or contract language and occasionally enter
a case as a friend of the court (amicus curiae) but we do not represent
boards in law suits or negotiations. Any information or opinions we have
concerning the legal implications arising from a given set of facts are
available to member boards and their superintendents, professional negoti-
ators or town attorneys upon request.
30. See generally, Speech by Hon. Audry P. Beck, Representative, Connecticut Gen-
eral Assembly, to delegates from all school boards, in New London Day, March 30, 1971,
at 3, col. 1.
31. See W. VAUsE, supra note 3.
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and deep professional interest in the same subject, 32 boards are being
urged, nevertheless, to do battle on pain of conviction of the charge of
breach of public trust.33 Fortified by private, and occasionally self-
indulgent, statutory constructions, 34 the boardmen now appear to be
mounting a feverish effort of their own to preserve board authority
from further incursions by teachers and, in some cases, even to reverse
previous accords, as expressed in existing contracts.35 It is against this
background that the experiences of the past should be examined, today's
problems analyzed, and recommendations made for their solution now
and in the future.
WHAT'S AHEAD FOR THE NEGOTIATORS?
Co-determination vs. Management Prerogative: The Scope
of Negotiations
It would seem that when teachers speak of achieving professional
status through collective bargaining or express concern over whether
labor organization tactics are suitable in "professional negotiations,"
they are manifesting a desire to bargain with respect to all matters gen-
erally embraced under the heading, "educational policies," and usually
view these issues on a parity with monetary concerns. 36 When school
administrators defend the role of board members in determining edu-
cational policies,3 7 they are frequently only displaying concern for con-
tinued exclusive determination of an array of working conditions, per-
sonnel policies, work rules, and like matters.
It is doubtful whether either side has been totally frank about its po-
sition. It would seem to be a time for candor, however, and teachers
should not hesitate to state that they are peculiarly fitted by training,
experience, and professional motivation to determine educational policies.
Major policy considerations and overall goals inevitably require a true
32. See Brown, Professors and Unions: The Faculty Senate: An Effective Alterna-
tive to Collective Bargaining in Higher Education?, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 252, 267-68
(1970).
33. See, e.g., note 27 supra.
34. Compare Pope & Vause supra, note 13, at 303-304 with CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-153d (Supp. 1970).
35. Associated Press reports in the Newark strike indicated: "The union won bind-
ing abritration in the last contract, but the board wants to weaken the clause. The
board has lost almost all the arbitration cases." New London Day, March 30, 1971, at
18, col. 6.
36. See Brown, supra note 32, at 267-68.
37. See, e.g., Co N-rn=cuT AssocAxoNs OF SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENTS, supra note 10.
[Vol. 12:711
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community consensus for their implementation, expressed by the elec-
torate through its public officials.
Superintendents of schools should make clear that the board's ex-
pressed wish to retain control over educational policies (tenure, selec-
tion of junior management personnel and faculty appointments gen-
erally, establishment of school calendars, length of school day, rule-
making with respect to use of teacher mail boxes and school bulletin
boards, curriculum development, class size, job descriptions, and a host
of related matters) is but the expression of the professional administra-
,tors' desire to retain as much control as possible.
Such matters have been, and foreseeably will continue to be, under
the direct control not of board members but of their designated repre-
sentatives. Indeed, it is seriously to be doubted whether the expression,
"board prerogative," enjoyed particularly great vogue in those halcyon
days when the superintendent painstakingly acquainted each newly
elected board member with the creed: matters pertaining to administra-
tion are peculiarly the function of the administrator and in these matters
school board members ought not interfere. Thus, the superintendent
hired personnel, made promotions, wrote job descriptions, settled tenure
upon the worthy, discharged the unfit, and even prepared board by-
laws, minutes and agenda.
Anyone concerned with collective negotiations, therefore, should
recognize that board members probably never determined for them-
selves, without professional assistance, those questions they now claim
to be exclusively in their domain. 38 Management prerogatives in private
industry are readily distinguishable, since those asserting the prerogatives
are usually qualified by training and experience to exercise it and fre-
quently must bear a large share of the financial consequences of failure.
If one recognizes that it is merely rational behavior for trained educators
to desire to formulate policies for public education in a meaningful
way,39 and if one also recognizes that school boards are not leaders of
38. See, e.g., Pope & Vause, supra note 13.
39. See Brown, supra, note 32. See also WoEr, The Coming Revolution In Public
School Management, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 1017, 1026-27 (1969) where the author notes:
The revolution in public school management is making its impact felt in
other areas traditionally regarded as the prerogatives of local school boards
and administrations. Some recent collective agreements negotiated between
school boards and teacher organizations provided for teacher involvement
in recruiting new faculty members. For example, one agreement in New
York requires that teachers elected by their colleagues at the school, sub-
ject, or departmental level interview candidates for teaching positions during
the recruiting process.
1971]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
industrial complexes dealing with a challenge to their stockholders'
profits, the prior experiences under national labor legislation 40 tending
to establish an area for the exercise of so-called management prerogatives
appears irrelevant.41
Furthermore, it would seem to be a legitimate aim and end result of
collective negotiations that the public be afforded an educational policy,
fully supported by the teachers who are required to administer it and
are qualified to make such policies in the first instance. Indeed, even
superintendents and their staffs were once classroom teachers, and if
the system is to function in formulating an educational program for the
community it must have daily participation by certified professional
personnel at all levels. In the past, the public interest was well served
by de facto co-determination of educational policies, although it was
never called by that name. School boards ought not to turn away from
the reality of the situation in the negotiations context but should seek
to express the parties' relationship in a meaningful way.
The Present Legislative Basis for Co-determination
In light of the community's right to policy-making based on teacher
participation, it is not surprising that Connecticut's negotiation law im-
poses on "[t] he ... board of education and the [teacher] organization
... the duty to negotiate with respect to salaries and other conditions
of employment about which either party wishes to negotiate, and such
duty shall include the obligation of such board.., to meet at reasonable
times, including meetings appropriately related to the budget-making
process, and confer in good faith with respect to salaries and other con-
ditions of employment .... ," 42 The Hawaii statute is similar in this
respect and, if anything, is more specific.
The employer and the .. . [teacher representative] shall meet at
reasonable times, including meetings in advance of the employer's
budget-making process. . . 43
It is at least arguable that this language requires both parties to weigh
educational policies against the cost of implementation and to make a
determination of the priorities involved. This would seem especially
40. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1964).
41. See generally 1 B. WERNE, LABOR RELATIONS LAW AND PAcIcE ch. 2 (1966).
42. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153d (Supp. 1970).
43. HAwAn REv. STAT. § 89-9 (Supp. 1970).
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helpful to the local legislative bodies in those states in which the school
board lacks authority to appropriate funds.
Of much greater significance are the first tentative steps taken in the
direction of mandated co-determination in Washington. There nego-
tiations are required on a broad range of matters, some of which are
clearly associated with the function of policy-making.44
The seventies will undoubtedly witness further inroads by teachers
into areas still regarded by some as exclusively board prerogatives.
Doubtlessly, such inroads will be made at heavy cost to educational
tranquility if boards and administrators persist in a hard line attitude
toward teachers' bargaining attempts in this area. It has been said that
if the labor organization is weak nothing is negotiable, but if it is strong
everything is negotiable, 4' and that a discussion of the range of negotiable
topics may be of little more than academic interest.46 It cannot be
doubted, however, that overly generalized definitions of the scope of
negotiations subject to narrow interpretations by boards of edu-
cation and broad interpretations by teacher organizations have ag-
gravated the situation. Difficulty in determining the legislative intent
as to the proper scope of negotiations has undoubtedly increased resort
to impasse procedures. Legislation in the seventies must define the
proper scope of and subjects for collective negotiations to avoid the
present tendency away from positive enumeration of the issues.' 7
An Emerging Constitutional Requirement for Collective Negotiations
Recent decisions recognizing the right of public employees to organ-
ize for collective negotiations leave unanswered the extent of the em-
ployers' duties in the bargaining process.48 It is, however, a logical step
from the recognition of a right to organize for purposes of collective
44. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28A72.030 (1970) which includes as negotiable
items "curriculum, textbook selection, in-service .training, student teaching programs,
personnel, hiring and assignment practices, leaves of absence, salaries and salary sched-
ules and non-instructional duties."
45. See D. WOLLETr & R. CHANiN, supra note 1, at 6:39 n.124.
46. Id. at 6:41.
47. Id. Discussing committee reports, such as that of the so-called Aaron Committee
which eschewed a listing of subjects in favor of a general proposition as to negotiability.
48. See Melton v. City of Atlanta, 39 USL.W. 2469 (N.D. Ga. March 21, 1971);
Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1968). See also Indianapolis
Educ. Ass'n v. Lewallen, 71 L.R.R.M. 2898 (S.D. Ind. 1969) (recognizing a constitu-
tionally based duty on a school board to negotiate with teachers' organizational repre-
sentative).
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bargaining to the imposition of a duty on the employer to negotiate
collectively. It would seem, moreover, that unlike a private employer,
a public agency may not adopt rules, or follow policies, in its dealings
with its employees which are patently arbitrary or capricious. Refusal
to consider a teacher organization's proposal for the adoption of a policy
of collective negotiations would seem arbitrary and capricious. More-
over, teacher organizations' requests for minor changes in school ad-
ministration could be denied, but not without reason and only after a
procedure which would have at least some of the elements of collective
bargaining. Arguably, therefore, a board of education is under a con-
stitutional duty to negotiate in good faith with its employees. The right,
if it exists, is based on the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment and undoubtedly the issue will soon be resolved by the courts.
However the Board may undertake the duty to negotiate, it cannot be
doubted that since governmental agencies are compelled to accord due
process of law,49 what is customary and permissible in the context of
private bargaining under regulatory labor legislation may be constitu-
tionally impermissible in public sector bargaining. It must be asked,
therefore, whether boards of education, or their agents, may ever en-
gage in any type of shrewd bargaining technique in light of the due
process requirement. Will the end of carrying out a public trust, as
defined by the board, justify the use of constitutionally impermissible
conduct to achieve that end?50 Thus, although the question of the scope
of negotiations and of bad faith therein should be reviewed by legisla-
tures, it is questionable whether statutes which contain no reference to
the requirement for good faith bargaining need do so, since it would
seem that minimal constitutional requirements of due process would
import standards of fair play and good faith."'
Who Should Negotiate?
If the scope of the bargainable issues and the techniques to be utilized
should now be carefully scrutinized, then the choice of persons charged
49. See text accompanying notes 150-61 infra.
50. For a consideration of sanctions against teachers and boards see text commencing
at note 92 infra.
51. Keyisbian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), and Garrity V. New Jersey,
385 U.S. 493 (1967), require total rejection of the shop-worn argument that public
employee status is dispositive where constitutional guarantees are concerned; so'me-
thing more is required of the employer than proof of status as justification for abridge-
ment of a right otherwise constitutionally guaranteed.
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with the conduct of negotiations should be reassessed. At present, teach-
ers and boardmen frequently conduct negotiations with little prepara-
tion, armed only with lengthy lists of demands and grievances. The
usual result is that the entire bargaining process collapses with negotia-
tions continuing into mediation and ultimately into fact-finding of one
kind or another depending upon the impasse procedures available in the
particular jurisdiction.52
Board members, in the first instance, would seem to have no place
at the bargaining table,53 but regrettably they have become personally
involved in work that private industry delegates to second level execu-
tives. The board's time and energies are consumed in seemingly end-
less, and often bitter, debate with a resultant lowering of its image
before teachers and taxpayers. Moreover, there exists a grave potential
for harm to the entire school system when personality clashes precipi-
tate work stoppages. Indeed, with as many as nine board members trying
to engage in ad hoc discussions of management's philosophy toward
negotiations, the board is often made to look ridiculous and sometimes is
committed to an extreme view.54
Boards must revert to their proper role as policy makers and leave
52. See D. WOLLrr & R. CHANiN, supra note 1, at 6:45-6:60.
53. The Connecticut Association of Boards of Education has recognized the "unde-
sirability" of the board of education acting as negotiator. The Association has stated:
The board of education as negotiator: Although fairly common, this prac-
tice is undesirable for many reasons:
(4) Few board members are in a position to keep themselves thoroughly
informed of current developments and trends in negotiations.
(5) Effective negotiations requires specialized skill, training and experience
in the field of educational negotiations; few board members qualify as pro-
fessional negotiators.
W. VAusE, supra note 3, at 10-11.
In those states which require "the board of education . . . to negotiate," it would
not seem that use of an expert negotiator would violate the statutory provision even
though a literal interpretation of the statute would require the board itself to negotiate.
See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153d (Supp. 1970).
54. A recent survey published by the National Education Association research di-
vision notes that most negotiations today are carried on by a team of board members,
superintendents, and other school administrators. While the role of board members
does not seem to have changed, superintendents today generally act as advisors to the
board only, whereas in the past they have advised both board and teacher negotiators.
See NATIONAL EDUCATION AssOCIATIoN, NEGOTIaTION REsEARCH DIGSr 15-21 (Nov. 1970).
Disagreements often occur among boardmen, during negotiations, kesulting in per-
sonal views being injected into negotiations; for example, that no teacher should be
granted a personal day and if ihe contract so provides, then the boardman will
withhold support for other parts of the contract.
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bargaining to full-time employee experts. They should be reluctant,
however, to assign this task to anyone not in their employ on a regular
basis, although nothing would prevent several boards from engaging
the services of one full-time specialist in teacher contract negotiations 5
This person must be extremely knowledgeable in all phases of public
education and, therefore, he must be selected from among present-day
teachers or school managers. It is even arguable that a knowledge of
collective bargaining techniques gained in the industrial world may be
a definite handicap in dealing with teachers, and that outside negotiators
ultimately tend to exacerbate the problem rather than solve it, how-
ever effective they may be on a one-time basis.56 Most importantly,
however, these professional negotiators have no real stake in the com-
munity or its schools and may be bound to leave for the next town
promptly upon the conclusion of negotiations. Daily meetings between
teachers and management representatives in the course of contract en-
forcement would seem more likely to build the mutual respect and trust
that is sorely needed if the parties' fears are to be overcome.
Teachers assigned duties at the bargaining table and in contract en-
forcement must similarly relate to their local educational system and
have the widest knowledge of and experience with their board's prob-
lems.57 Moreover, failure of the teacher negotiator to achieve a complete
understanding of the educational goals of the local staff can have ex-
tremely adverse effects5s and threaten cherished academic freedoms with
union regimentation. Any tendency to commit negotiations to the most
militant, youthful "hard-liner" is to be deplored if he is lacking in essen-
tial knowledge of the needs of local teachers. This may not only aggra-
55. For a discussion of possible adverse effects of agreements and exchanges of in-
formation between boards, see text accompanying notes 103-06, infra.
56. A case in point is the experience of the Newington Teachers' Association,
Newington, Conn. Interview with Mr. Richard W. Peplau, President, Newington
Teachers' Association, in Hartford, Connecticut, Aug. 15, 1970. See also Wollett, The
Coming Revolution in Public School Management, 67 MicH. L. REv. 1017, 1030 (1967)
pointing out that such labor mediators, fact-finders and arbitrators may tend to treat
teachers' professional proposals as mere "window-dressing".
57. A team of negotiators (the personnel policy committee, as it is sometimes called
in the NEA affiliated organizations) should include elementary school specialists, special
subject experts, high school spokesmen (from all tracks of the curriculum), and junior
high or middle school teachers. The problems of all groups must be sifted and analyzed
in preparing for negotiations, and priorities must be fairly determined in contract
settlement.
58. Cf. Brown, supra note 32, at 268-74. Academic freedom could suffer under
rigid organizational control, and important educational concepts could be pushed aside
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vate a bad situation at the bargaining table but also may commit the
teacher organization to actions which it would prefer to reject.59
It is essential that a corps of teacher-board relations specialists be
recruited promptly from within the teaching profession. The state
boards of education have been lax in developing acceptable programs
for training negotiators and others charged with contract administra-
tion, although New Jersey seems to be a notable exception." The ap-
parent tendency of some state boards and their executives to maintain
a neutral attitude may be the cause of the noted failure to train skilled
negotiators and should no longer be accepted without critical examina-
tion.61
If all will look anew at the scope of negotiations in terms of the rea-
sonable aims of the parties in collective negotiations, and if the parties
will detail their arguments with supporting evidence, presented by
skilled negotiators, prepared to bargain in accordance with the strictures
of due process and professional ethics, then settlement of many more
teacher disputes could be effected without resort to impasse. If the de-
velopments of the past few months continue, however, the prediction
of increasing tensions in the schools will be realized in the seventies.
THE RELEVANCY OF IMPASSE PROCEDURES IN THE STRIELESS SECTOR
Background and Early Attempts to Resolve Impasse
The development of impasse procedures in the public sector probably
preceded the passage of most negotiating acts, since school boards and
their teachers had had" prior disputes and even major confrontations
59. Cf. D. WOLLETT & R. CHANiN, supra note 1, at 3:2-3:3.
60. New Jersey, by statute, provides a program to assist boards of education in
negotiations. The statute provides:
The [public employment relations] commission in conjunction with the
Institute of Management and Labor of Rutgers, the State University, shall
develop and maintain a program for the guidance of public employers in
employee-management relations, to provide technical advice to public em-
ployers on employee-management programs, to assist in the development
of programs for training management personnel in the principles and pro-
cedures of consultation, negotiation and the settlement of disputes in the
public service, and for the training of management officials in the discharge
of their employee-management relations responsibilities in the public interest.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-8.3 (Supp. 1970).
61. The failure of the state board to publish even interim instructions guiding local
board members in negotiations would also indicate state failure to accept a proper role
in negotiations, and this is especially bad if the resulting vacuum is filed by persons
having no official responsibility.
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that required mediation of some form of fact-finding. '2 Thus, the teach-
ers' first encounter with impasse resolution techniques usually involved
impartial officials, often elected, who seemed anxious to help teachers
and who appeared unsympathetic to any form of bureaucratic arbitra-
riness.6 3
Not surprisingly, therefore, many public school managers resisted
any form of mediation or fact-finding and, in fact, still vigorously de-
cline compulsory arbitration, whether over grievances or contracts,
because they usually do not prevail. 4 This attitude has had a debilitating
effect upon the entire negotiation process, since the teachers, having no
reason to refuse the result of a binding arbitration (or even the reason-
able recommendations of a mediator) are, practically speaking, bound
by awards in arbitration, even though termed advisory. School boards,
on the other hand, with apparent impunity, reject the advice of medi-
ators and act with regal imperiousness toward any fact-finding award
which displeases them.65
The array of fact-finding, arbitration, and mediation techniques in
current use has been catalogued, described and evaluated with exemplary
thoroughness by others.6  We undertake here an examination of the
subject at the operations level, where the parties are fully engaged, and
certain difficult questions we pose. First, is all this machinery really
achieving effective results, especially in light of the costs involved?
Second, is there any danger that professional negotiators for school
boards are forcing issues to impasse and, if so, to what purpose? Third,
what can be done to impose meaningful sanctions on parties who per-
sist in refusing reasonable settlements of their disputes after negotiations
and impasse procedures have been exhausted?
Fact-Finding and Advisory Arbitration
If.the experience of the past few years is of any significance at all,
62. See, e.g., Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d
482 (1951).
63. In the Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n case, the governor of Connecticut became in-
volved in the dispute. Id. at 271, 83 A.2d at 483.
64. See note 35 supra.
65. Boards and their attorneys usually rely on statements such as those found in
Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 279, 83 A.2d 482 (1951), to
the effect that a board's "power to submit to arbitration would not extend to ques-
tions of policy but might extend to questions of liability.. . Agrements [sic] to submit
all disputes to arbitration, commonly found in union contracts, are in a different
category."
66. See, e.g., G. RoUMELT, THE ROLE OF THE FAct FINDER 85 (PLI ed. 1968).
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then surely its greatest significance is in the area of impasse piocedures,
especially in fact-finding or non-binding compulsory contract arbitra-
tion,67 which is now in danger of degenerating into the fact-finding
follies, an annual waste of time. Advisory arbitration (or fact-finding;
the terms are somewhat synonymous) is of two types: (1) that in which
the arbitrators must base any award exclusively on the evidence before
them,68 and (2) that in which the arbitrators may enter awards based
on the evidence before them, as well as on all other knowledge or infor-
mation possessed by them. 9
In all events, the parties must carefully marshal the evidence and skill-
fully plead their cases. The precision of the skilled trial lawyer is not
an absolute necessity, but if the tragi-comedy of an arbitration presented
by an unskilled, would-be advocate is once observed, the tendency to
recommend lawyer-trained advocates in impasse procedures becomes
very strong. If the alternative is simplification or exclusion of issues,
then so be it. If the benefits sought are not worth the cost of adequate
preparation and expert representation, then it is submitted that the mat-
ter should not be placed in arbitration at all. °
Moreover, by their very nature certain matters are extremely difficult
to arbitrate, and teacher bargaining teams must recognize this before
the matter reaches arbitration. For example, consider the difficulties
attendant upon a teacher proposal that class size be limited to tventy-
three students in a self-contained classroom situation. To formulate an
award on this issue, the arbitrators at least must know the total school
population, present and predicted; the number and kind of classrooms
presently available; the extent to which the proposal would require the
construction of additional classrooms and their location (with due re-
gard to any possible problem of de facto segregation resulting); and the
number and training of the teachers available, and how many additional
teachers, if any, must be hired. Indeed, there are a host of sub-issues
67. Most states have accepted some form of impasse procedure. California, for
example, has no specific provision. See CAr.. EDUC. CODE § 13080-13088 (West 1969).
Binding contract arbitration on all matters is not required in any state. Only two
states, Maine and Rhode Island, direct binding contract arbitration as to some issues.
In Maine, for example, the statute provides for binding contract arbitration of all
matters "other than salaries, pensions and insurance. . . ." ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 965.4 (Supp. 1970). New York permits the parties to develop their own binding
arbitration procedures for impasse resolution. See N.Y. Civ. Siuxv. LA-W § 209.2 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1969).
68. See, e.g., CoNN. GENT. STAT. ANN. § 153f (Supp. 1970).
69. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN . tit. 26, § 965.3 (1969).
70. See, e.g., note 12 supra.
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with which the panel may be required to deal, e.g., the effectiveness of
such a provision in the contract.71 Is this provision legally enforceable,
and if it is not, then of what value is it in the contract? 72
. Perhaps teachers and boards unable to agree on matters such as class
size should strive in arbitration to win adoption of certain principles, the
application of which to other facts found would be dispositive. Per-
haps a contract could be recommended, to the parties that would name
other fact-finders who would apply the recommended principles. Im-
plementation of the decision and the time within which it shall be ac-
complished is also bargainable and should be determined by the arbitra-
tors. If possible, alternatives should also be offered as, for example, in-
creased compensation or other form of quid pro quo for teachers work-
ing an understaffed school system or without adequate classrooms and
other necessities. In this manner the board will be encouraged to move
toward solutions to problems too vast for consideration in a single
arbitration.
Another aspect of impasse today, especially at mediation, is the ap-
parent tendency to use this procedure as an extension of collective
negotiations. One cannot ignore the fact that the parties' attitudes have
seemingly been conditioned by inadequacies in mediation, especially
a lack of trained personnel'7  coupled with an inexplicable ritualism
which educators seem to evolve in connection with their every task.-'
Thus, after a few successful attempts at mediation,75 a standard pro-
cedure emerges (somewhat like a lesson plan). The ritual includes a
host of t&ms whose meaning and moment of application are known
only to the initiated. Thus, everyone apparently knows during nego-
tiations over the salary schedules that a visit to the state capitol for
mediation will result, and that a suggestion will be made by the medi-
ator that "mid-point" be applied. Since this involves nothing more or
71. See, e.g., West Hartford Educ. Ass'n and Bd. of Educ., Opinion of Neutral
Arbitrator, III (Case No. 1230 0130 69, filed Oct. 3, 1969, American Arbitration Associa-
tion, Hartford, Conn.).
72. See, e.g., Brief on Behalf of West Hartford Board of Education, filed in West
Hartford Educ. Ass'n and Bd. of Educ., Case No. 1230 0130 69, American Arbitration
Association, Hartford, Conn. (1969).
73. In Connecticut, for example, staff assistants to the Commissioner of Education
endeavored to mediate. Later the General Assembly established a panel of persons
who had had prior experience in labor disputes, or who had had prior involvement
with public education. See CorN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f(a) (Supp. 1970).
74. See generally K. LAw, K. MEu.LY, T. MONDANI & J. SANDLER, THE MANUAL FoR
TEAcER NEGOTIAnNG (1966).
75. See note 11 supra.
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less than "splitting the difference," the negotiators obviously will not
make a true final offer to settle short of mediation, for this is not allowed
for in the ritual.
In all probability, the parties may hold back certain issues which
will be modified or dropped entirely in exchange for concessions from
the other side in mediation. Moreoirer, those parties that understand
the mediation ritual, introduce additional refinements so that virtually
the entire economic package is reserved for full fact-finding, or com-
pulsory non-binding arbitration.76
Where teachers lack experience in negotiations, they tend to seek
salvation in mediation and fact-finding.77 Rather than approaching ne-
gotiations with a well prepared case, the team learns its case only with
each step of the impasse procedure.7 8 Such negotiators are usually ig-
norant of the role of mediators and do not realize that professional
mediators will put the greatest settlement pressure on the weakest
party.79 Of course, these are usually the same inexperienced, under-
financed, poorly prepared teachers, whose sword and buckler is all too
frequently only the righteousness of their claims. In the adjoining
room, meanwhile, the school managers huddle with their board of edu-
cation, steadfastly asserting the non-negotiability of many issues or the
"inappropriateness to the contract" of others,80 secure in the knowledge
76. See, e.g., Award of the Arbitration Panel, Newington Teachers' Ass'n v. Board
of Educ., 15-16 (Aug. 23, 1970, Secretary, Connecticut State Board of Education, Hart-
ford, Connecticut).
77. Teachers in Connecticut at least had high hopes for mediation and boards in
1966 seemed somewhat awed by the presence of the Commissioner of Education. Settle-
ments were easier to reach than later when the exprienced party negotiators took over
and guided the mediation with a view to ultimate arbitration. See note 11 supra.
There is no reason to believe the experience was a unique one.
78. See, West Hartford Educ. Ass'n and Bd. of Educ, Opinion of the Neutral Arbi-
trator, VI (Case No. 1230 0130 69, filed Oct. 3, 1969, American Arbitration Association,
Hartford, Conn.) where it is stated:
[S]hould the parties ever have to go this route again we would respectfully
suggest a full discussion of all issues before arbitration, and the dropping
of clearly unnecessary or unwise items which should be obvious to two
intelligent parties honestly seeking to obtain a mutual accommodation, but
which have to be fully considered by an arbitration panel in a careful search
for a kernel of merit.
79. See D. WOLLETr & R. CNIN, supra note 1, at 6:51.
80. Cf., e.g., West Hartford Educ. Ass'n and West Hartford Bd. of Educ., Concurring
Opinion of Board Appointed Arbitrator, 1-2 (Case No. 1230 0130 69, filed Oct. 3, 1969
American Arbitration Association, Hartford, Connecticut) wherein it is stated:
My concurrence in the Award of the majority of this Panel results from
an exhaustive analysis and discussion by each Panel member of each of the
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that teachers cannot lawfully strike,8' and certainly cannot match the
unlimited funds and public relations machinery available to the board to
justify its every decision. The board's position seems impregnable and
in most cases it is, until a strike or other work stoppage finally closes the
schools.
In these circumstances, it should be clear that boards of education
have the most to gain in mediation and fact-finding. It is arguable that
professional managers and their paid negotiators may be resorting to
the impasse techniques to weaken teacher organizations financially and
to impair the morale of the bargaining unit by a series of frustrations
created by a seemingly omnipotent school board. 2
The cost of mediation and fact-finding is said to be a deterrent to its
use and, therefore, a reason why parties should settle short of impasse.
It has also been noted, however, that the shibboleths of the private sec-
tor are not meaningful in the context of public bargaining. This is
because school boards have virtually unlimited resources for bargaining
thirty-nine individual issues presented. However, I wish to make it clear
that I do not view this opinion as in any way determining one of the more
basic underlying problems created by the Connecticut Statutes, to wit: the
obvious conflict between the powers granted to local Boards of Education
under Section 10-220 of the General Statutes and the obligations to negotiate
with respect to teacher "working conditions" thrust upon such boards by
Section 10-153d of the General Statutes. It is clear to me that this opinion
does not answer the question of whether a Board of Education may stand
on the powers granted it by Section 10-220 of the General Statutes and
legally refuse a request of a teacher organization, negotiating teacher work-
ing conditions, when in its best judgment such Board of Education does not
feel it would be in the best interest of the Town (which such Board of
Education represents) to include such a provision in an agreement. Clearly
this issue was not before us, because at no time did the Board refuse to in-
clude a specific provision but rather indicated its reluctance to incorporate a
given clause in the agreement. Neither did it refuse to discuss any particular
association proposal.
Cf. North Dearborn Heights School Dist. and Local 1439, North Dearborn Heights
Fed'n of Teachers, Mich. Fed'n of Teachers, 1965-66 LAB. Ops. 434 (Mich. L.M.B. 1966).
81. See text accompanying note 108 et seq., infra.
82. In Newark, for example, the Board of Education apparently asserted that the
previous year's contract must be completely renegotiated on grievance and non-pro-
fessional responsibilities. This caused one reporter to note:
This position, considered unusually strong for labor-management talks, has
led the Teachers' Union to charge that what the Board really wants is to de-
stroy the union and force white teachers out of Newark.
Butterfield, Newark: A Grim Specter Hangs Over The City, N.Y. Times, April 11,
1971, at 8, col. 1.
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and are seldom called to account by taxpayers to explain expenditures
for purposes relating to teacher bargaining. 3
Whatever may be the supposed public relations effect of the issuance
of findings and recommendations adverse to the school board's position,
it must be noted that political opponents rarely use such reports in cam-
paigns to unseat board members. Although the news media seem to
strive to publish the facts found and the recommendations made, the
school managers are adept at conducting "the war of words." 84 Un-
fortunately, most media coverage is restricted to the factual context,
whereas, not unlike an author's play, the parties' pre-impasse positions
should receive critical review by knowledgeable newsmen after arbi-
tration is concluded. Of course, those states which make arbitration
binding 5 would seem to menace the parties sufficiently to force agree-
ments at least on those issues which are subject to binding arbitration. 6
Sanotions
The Present Situation
Some measure of the distance yet to be traveled before sanctions will
be imposed on parties who fail to reach a contract during collective
negotiations can be had by reference to a North Carolina statute8 7 which
expressly forbids teacher-board negotiations, and even prohibits teachers
from organizing for such purposes, although that portion of the statute
was promptly declared unconstitutional.88 Moreover, of those states
which do accord teachers the right to negotiate collectively, only a few
have made any statutory provision for sanctions, even against a party
proceeding in bad faith.89
83. A Connecticut town meeting in 1969, however, at first refused to appropriate
funds to pay attorney's fees incurred by the board of education in the course of teacher
negotiations. In another case, a town attorney refused to sanction the retention by a
board of education of a private attorney and at first directed the town treasurer not to
pay the attorney's statement for past services.
84. In the Newark strike, Mayor Gibson charged that the original issues in the strike
have been submerged in a welter of "emotional inflammatory rhetoric:' N.Y. Times,
April 11, 1971, at 1, col 3.
85. See, e.g., ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965.4 (Supp. 1970).
86. The experience in Maine indicates that the parties reach agreement short of arbi-
tration on those issues as to which arbitration is binding. Interview with J. Donald
Belleville, Assistant Director of Field Services, Maine Teachers Association, Augusta,
Maine, April 28, 1971.
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-97 (1965).
88. See Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
89. See, e.g., MicH. STAT. AiNN. § 17-455 (1968).
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Perhaps equally troublesome is the absence in most states of an ad-
ministrative procedure for dealing with complaints of unfair labor prac-
tices (or its professional equivalent, unethical conduct)." As a result,
no working definition of "good faith" has yet evolved in the context of
board-teacher dealings, except, perhaps, in Michigan, New York, and
Wisconsin where significant attempts are being made to evolve a pattern
of sanctions, and where administrative procedures exist.91 Of course,,
no sanction equivalent to actual or threatened loss of profits is possible
in the public sector. In the absence of an administrative procedure with
provision for sanctions, the parties must resort to the courts whose
judges, seemingly startled by the presence of a labor law case on the
docket involving substantial constitutional issues, tend to treat the teach-
ers' claims of bad faith most gingerly.92
It would seem, therefore, that the absence of real sanctions not only
has had an adverse effect on the otherwise promising possibilities of
some, if not most, impasse procedures, but also has directly contributed
to strikes in the public sector, since the impasse process tends toward
spiraling frustrations in which teachers become increasingly more po-
larized.
Evolving Sanctions Against Boardmen Pending Corrective Legislation
It is interesting to note at the outset that the only extensive statutory
provision for sanctions has met with limited success.93 New York's
Taylor Law aims a direct threat against the labor organization's purse
and at contract provisions respecting organizational efforts such as
check-off privileges.9 4 Notwithstanding, the law actually. relies on a
broadly based court injunction as the solution to a teachers' work stop-
90. See, e.g., CoNN. Gaw. STAT. § 10-153d (Supp. 1970).
91. M~cH. STAT. ANN. § 17-455 (1968); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 200-12, (McKinney
Supp. 1969); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (Supp. 1969). Significantly, therefore, teachers
are seeking legislative establishment of teacher relations boards. In Connecticut, legisla-
tion has been introduced to establish such a board with broad powers to issue cease
and desist orders and to order the payment of arbitration and/or mediation costs
where there is a failure to negotiate in good faith.
92. In Connecticut, we know of no broadly based opinion on teacher-board relations,
although 18 injunctions have issued, 17 of them in the past three years, with 10 con-
tempt proceedings. See note 2 supra.
93. In September, 1967, New York teachers struck for fourteen days. N. Y. Times,
Sept. 11, 1967 at 1, col. 8. In the fall of 1968, schools were closed for two months.
Mayer, The Full and Sometimes Very Surprising Story of Ocean Hill, The Teachers'
Union and the Teachers' Strikes of 1968, id. Feb. 2, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 18.
94. N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW §§ 200-212 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
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page and has not made extensive provisions for reciprocal sanctions in
cases involving the school board's apparent refusal to bargain in good
faith.95
Some possible remedies presently available appear to have been over-
looked. A recalcitrant board rmght be prorogued with attendant con-
trol of local education by the state board. 96 While this sanction would
be limited in scope and tume to that which, in the opinion of the state
board of education, is necessary to pernt a resolution of the problem,
the ultimate step could involve removal from office. 97 Where state de-
partment of education officials are intimately involved in the process of
mediation and fact-finding, the suggested sanctions would seem particu-
95. Failure to bargain in good faith on the part of the board was found in North
Dearborn Heights School Dist. and Local 1439, North Dearborn Heights Fed'n of
Teachers, Mich. Fed'n of Teachers, 1965-1966 LAB. O's. 434 (Mich. L.M.B. 1966) where
the trial examner stated:
The employer violated the Act by coming to the bargaining table with his
mind hermetically sealed against the thoughts of entering into any agree-
ment. Collective bargaining imposes upon the Employer a duty to bargain
to the end that a collective bargaining agreement should be reached. An
essential requirement is that there be a sincere endeavor to overcome ob-
stacles and difficulties existing between the parties. I find that the Em-
ployer made no reasonable effort to resolve the difficulties between the
parties. On the basis of the above, I find that the Employer's course
of conduct in the month of May, 1966, constituted an additional violation
of [the Act].
Id. at 444.
96. State boards of education generally have wide powers to supervise and control
local boards. In Connecticut, for example, the "educational interests of the state" over
which the State Board of Education has general supervision include that "the mandates
in the general statutes pertaining to education within the jurisdiction of the state board
of education be implemented." Presumably this would include supervision of the statu-
torily mandated duty to negotiate in good faith. See CoNN. GEN_. STAT. ANN. § 10-4, §
10-4a, § 10-153d (Supp. 1970).
Id. § 10-4b provides:
Whenever said state board finds that a board of education of any school
district has failed to make reasonable provision to implement the educational
interests of the state as defined in section 10-4a, said state board shall con-
duct an inquiry to identify the cause of such failure and shall determine
what recommendations should be made as to the necessary remedies to be
pursued by the responsible local or state agencies. In conducting such in-
quires, the state board of education shall give the board of education in-
volved the opportunity to be heard. Said state board may summon by sub-
poena any person whose testimony may be pertinent to the inquiry and any
records or documents related to the provision of public education in the
school district.
97. No statute has been found which mandates removal.
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larly sound, since the state's chief education official is thereby in an ex-,
cellent position to collect the facts upon which his recommendations
and the judgment of the state board of education would be based.
Teachers should explore what, if any, constitutionally protected rights
may exist in respect to teacher-board bargaining." If such rights exist,
then a violation would be accompanied by consequences not heretofore
observed in the private sector. School board members and their hired
negotiators, and even associations of school board members, maintained
in whole or in part by contributions of public funds, may be personally
liable for money damages without a right of reimbursement from the
taxpayers.99 Even independent contractors, paid out of tax funds and
purporting to act under color of local law, are state officials for all pur-
poses.' 0 Such persons enjoy no immunity from suit under pertinent
civil rights legislation and may be personally liable for their tort-like
conduct in depriving teachers of benefits otherwise obtainable by col-
lective bargaining.1 1 The school board itself is subject to the court's
mandate because all equitable remedies apply under the civil rights act
to municipal corporations, including school boards.1 2 It cannot be
denied that collective negotiations are, in every case, the conduct of
public business by public officials bound by constitutional imperatives.
The full extent of the constitutional imperative, if directed against
school board members, needs to be carefully considered. Can boardmen,
for example, without incurring liability under the Civil Rights Act of
1871, meet and confer with members of other school boards and ex-
change information concerning their respective ultimate positions on
wages and other conditions of employment, while making contradictory
98. Recently teachers have turned to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. S 1983
(1964), for protection of their organizational right. The Act provides in pertinent
part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
99. See generally C. ANTiEAu, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTs: CIVIL PRACTICE 47-121
(1971); Nolte, Suddenly bodrd7nen CAN be sued as individuals, AM. ScHOOL BD. J.,
30-32 (Oct. 1970). See also text accompanying notes 50-61, infra.
100. See Stambler v. Dillon, 302 F. Supp. 1250 (S.D. N.Y. 1969); Johnson v. Crumlish,
224 F. Supp. 22 (ED. Pa. 1963).
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd.. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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claims to the general public and teachers in bargaining sessions? 13 It is
perfectly clear that the impact of such meetings on collective negotia-
tions can be great, and that teachers may suffer considerable economic
loss by reason of concerted action of board members. Similarly, may
school managers conduct meetings among themselves and determine
minimum wages to be offered new teachers for a region or state? 1 4
Certainly salary agreements, if reached, would clearly subvert the
purpose of collective negotiations. The anti-competitive effect of such
agreements is obvious. Even if no agreements as to salary were reached,
the question remains whether the mere exchange of salary informa-
tion while teacher negotiations are in progress violates the purpose
and intent of collective negotiations. Analogous exchanges of price
information in the business world, even without an agreement to adhere
to a specific price schedule, violate the Sherman Act, 05 and it would
seem that exchanges of information and establishment of guidelines
relative to teachers' salaries and other conditions of employment should
likewise not be countenanced. When school administrators take anti-
competitive action outside meetings properly convened and open to the
public, their conduct should be prohibited, if it is not already, and
remedies analogous to those available in antitrust actions should be
afforded."0 6
The evolution of remedies involving liability for money damages and
allowance of counsel fees and expenses could have a sobering effect upon
an imperious school board, and could provide an alternative to a strike or
work slow-down. Fear of these sanctions by boards predictably will be
great. There will be a resultant reappraisal of the board position to-
ward its teachers which, hopefully, will have a salutary effect.
Teacher Sanctions and Licensing
Teachers, not unlike school boards, may be exposed to sanctions that
103. It has been stated that bad faith could be imputed to a board where it agrees
with other boards to a ceiling on salaries. See Pope & Vause, supra note 13, at 309.
104. See Edwardsburg Public Schools and Edwardsburg Educ. Ass'n, 1968 LAE.
Ops. 927, CCH LAB. REP. 49,99422 (Mich. L.M.B.).
105. In United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337-38 (1969), the
Court stated:
The inferences are irresistible that the exchange of price information has
had an anticompetitive effect in the industry, chilling the vigor of price
competition .... Price is too critical, too sensitive a control to allow it to
be used even in an informal manner to restrain competition.
106. Such sanctions should include not only injunctive relief but provisions for treble
damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
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have been rarely discussed extensively. For example, teachers, like doc-
tors and lawyers and unlike most of their fellow government employees,
are licensed by the state to engage in their profession. Revocation of
this license by procedures similar to disbarment may be possible, there-
fore, and may be fully justified where the teacher's conduct in collective
negotiations has been unethical. There is no reason why state boards of
education or other proper authorities cannot expand existing procedures
as necessary to accommodate the administration of unethical practice
complaints.1 7 Presumably, such complaints would be generated by
false representations in negotiations, persistent refusal to bargain, dem-
onstrable bad faith, or similar conduct.
Professionals subject to licensing may be denied their right to practice
entirely, or they may be limited to some degree. It would not seem
that any teacher making a good faith effort to negotiate the settlement
of a dispute need fear curtailment of his license if his conduct will be
judged by an impartial tribunal at the state level.
Recommendations for Legislation in the Impasse Area
Perhaps the major shortcoming of presently existing impasse resolu-
tion procedures is the lack of forceful sanctions at all levels. The ab-
sence of sanctions may be explained by an apparent assumption that
impasses are legitimately reached despite the fact that both parties are
proceeding in good faith. The sixties have proven this to be a largely
unwarranted assumption. Legislation is immediately needed which, in
addition to making impasse procedures available, provides sanctions,
such as payment of costs and attorneys fees, where it is found that either
party is not approaching the collective negotiations process with the
requisite good faith. Immediate appeal of such decisions to an inde-
pendent board should be provided. Should lack of good faith continue,
more drastic remedies, such as those previously discussed, would be
necessary through specific remedial legislation.
107. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-146a (Supp. 1970) which provides:
The state board of education'may, in accordance with such regulations as
it prescribes, grant a certificate of qualification to teach ...in any public
school in the state and may revoke the same.
Connecticut has established an advisory board on state certification of teachers con-
sisting of nine members of the teaching profession, three board members and three
electors to advise the state board of education with respect to the standards and pro-
cedures for the issuance and revocation of professional certificates.
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TEACHER REFUSALS TO WORK: STRIKES AND OTHER WORK STOPPAGES
Some Threshold Questions in Equity
Significance of the Employment Relationship
When negotiations fail, teachers have increasingly turned to con-
certed refusals to work,' and injunctive relief is normally obtained. 09
Where the applicable statute is couched in language such as: "No cer-
tified professional employee shall.., engage in any strike or concerted
refusal to render services", "0 it would seem that an employment rela-
tionship must be proved as the sine qua non to the grant of a restraining
order of any kind.
In the ordinary situation, teachers sign one of several types of em-
ployment contracts. An initial contract is used by non-tenure teachers
and a long-term contract by tenure teachers. In both cases an annual
salary agreement is normally executed some time prior to the com-
mencement of the academic year. The master contract is executed by
the authorized teacher organization. At any given time, therefore, the
school administration may be faced with an expired master contract, no
current annual salary agreements, and a collection of "evergreen" initial
and long-term contracts which appear to be dependent for their re-
newal upon the execution of annual salary agreements.
While no court has yet ruled that the fact situation just stated consti-
tutes an absence of an employment relationship so that jurisdiction to
issue an injunction is lacking, the issue has been troublesome. In School
District for City of Holland v. Holland Education Association, the
concurring opinion stated:
Until written contracts of employment were executed, they
[teachers] were under no obligation to report for duty; they could
not absent themselves from their positions, for they had none; they
could not stop work for they had not yet begun to work, nor had
they agreed even to work; and finally they could not abstain
from performing the duties of employment for any purpose, for
they had not assumed yet any such duties .... .11
108. See note 2 supra.
109. Michigan may be an exception to the usual rule. Cf. School Dist. for City of
Holland v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
110. See, e.g., Corm. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153d (Supp. 1970).
111. 380 Mich. 314, 329; 157 N.W.2d 206, 212 (1968).
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In Pinnellas County Classroom Teachers' Association v. Board of
Public IMtruction,"2 the Florida Supreme Court upheld the issuance of
an injunction in a case in which the teachers had signed individual con-
tracts, even though a master contract had not been concluded. The court
indicated that had the teachers not signed their individual contracts for
the ensuing school year it might have been constrained to reach a dif-
ferent result."1
In National Education Association, Inc. v. Lee City Board of Public
Instruction,"14 on facts involving a Florida injunction against striking
teachers, a federal court found that nothing in the prior state court
order enjoining the strike ". . . affect[ed] or prevent[ed] a defendant
[teacher] from effecting a lawful resignation." 115 When the local school
board thereafter attempted to condition teachers' return to work upon
payment of a fine, the United States District Court ruled that since the
teachers had effectively resigned they were legally free not to return
to the classroom. The importance of the Lee City case lies in its recog-
nition that there may be a termination of the employer-employee rela-
tionship. It does not appear whether, as in Pinnellas,"6 the teachers had
signed their individual contracts for the school year.
The only argument that can be made by a board of education con-
fronted by such a fact situation is that the teacher tenure law creates
"'a continuing contract," 1 and that reasonable compensation is to be
implied in law by the court. It would seem, however, that tenure is a
statutory right to a contract, with certain specified exceptions." 8 The
112. 214 So. 2d'34 (Fla. 1968).
113. Id. at 37.
114. 299 F. Supp. 834 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
115. Id. at 836.
116. 214 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1968).
117. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Temporary Injunction, Helm v.
Groton Educ. Ass'n, No. 37037 (Sup. Ct. New London County, Conn. 1969).
118. E.g., the Connecticut tenure act provides:
(a) . .. The contract of employment of a teacher shall be in writing and
may be terminated at any time for any of the reasons enumerated in sub-
divisions (1) to (6), inclusive, of subsection (b) of this section, but other-
wise it shall be renewed for a second, third or fourth year unless such
teacher has been notified in writing prior to March first in one school year
that such contract will not be renewed for the following year ....
(b) Beginning with and subsequent to the fourth year of continuous em-
ploymem of a teacher by a board of education, the contract of employment
of a teacher shall be renewed from year to year, except that it may be
terminated at any time for one or more of the following reasons: (1) In-
efficiency or incompetence (2) insubordination against reasonable rules of
the board of education; (3) moral misconduct; (4) disability, as shown by
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statute, however, cannot create a contractual relationship." 9 This must
depend upon the intent of the parties, and the parties obviously intend
that an agreement as to salary is essential to a contractual relationship. In
the absence of such an agreement there exists no employer-employee
,relationship, and it would seem that a court cannot order the teachers
to teach since there is no statutory basis for the exercise of such juris-
diction.
Good Faith
No court appears to have refused an injunction to a board on the
grounds that its members failed to negotiate with the defendants in good
faith, although the issue has doubtlessly been raised.120 Even in the
absence of an express statutory provision requiring good faith bargain-
ing, injunctive relief should be denied where there is evidence of lack
of good faith on the board's part.121
Irreparable Harm
Although a few jurisdictions expressly direct courts to grant injunc-
tive relief against teacher work stoppages without requiring proof of
irreparable harm, 122 it is at least arguable that such statutes might violate
competent medical evidence; (5) elimination of the position to which the
teacher was appointed, if no other position exists to which he may be ap-
pointed if qualified; or (6) other due and sufficient cause.
CONN. GEr. STAT. ANN. § 10-151 (a) (b) (Supp. 1970) (emphasis added).
119. See generally 9 WLLISTON ON CommAcrs § 1012 (3d ed. 1967).
120. In one case, for example, Helm v. Groton Educ. Ass'n, No. 37037 (Sup. Ct.
New London County Conn. 1969), on a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction, the
court allowed extensive testimony on the point. The defendants' claims that the board
engaged in delaying tactics in order to frustrate an opportunity for impartial arbitra-
tion under a statute later repealed were accorded a hearing; apparently on the basis that
the issuance of a prerogative writ lay in the sound discretion of the court. Evidence
was also adduced that the members of the plaintiff board of education were also
members of an association of boards of education which devoted time and energy to
the dissemination of information regarding teacher-board negotiations, including the
publication of data respecting announcements of contract signings, salaries, and major
contract terms achieved therein. Testimony of school board members, both within and
without the community involved indicated that private meetings of the area board mem-
bers were held at which salary negotiations were discussed, although no agreement was
reached as to salary.
121. Cf., School Dist. for City of Holland v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314, 157
N.W.2d 206 (1968).
122. E.g., the Maine statute provides:
Violations of this section [prohibiting work stoppages, slow downs and
strikes) may be enjoined upon complaint of any party affected by such vio-
lation .... [N]either an allegation nor proof of unavoidable substantial
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state constitutions commanding separation of powers, since the legisla-
ture has usurped the judicial function of conditioning the issuance of
the prerogative writ.123 Normally, however, legislatures have left the
matter to the courts, presumably permitting the courts to achieve a de-
gree of balance between the competitive interests of boards and their
employees by application of traditional equitable principles.124 It would
appear, therefore, that there should be proof of irreparable harm, and
even then the court must carefully husband its discretionary power to
grant or withhold relief depending upon the facts of the case.
Scope of the Injunction
Anti-teacher injunctions are either directed against individual teach-
ers125 or against the teacher organization and some, but not necessarily
all, teachers. 126 The courts have not shown great interest in resolving
the thorny legal issues posed, but instead have issued ex parte injunc-
tions freely, often merely upon the representation of an attorney, or
occasionally after taking some brief testimony. 27
and irreparable injury to the complainant's property shall be required to
obtain a temporary restraining order or injunction.
Mz. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 964(3) (1969).
123. In School Dist. for City of Holland v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314, 325,
157 N.W.2d 206, 210 (1968) the court noted,
To attempt to compel legislatively, a court of equity in every instance of
a public employee strike to enjoin it would be to destroy the independence
of the judicial branch of government.
124. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153f (Supp. 1970), while providing for ex
parte injunctive relief, further provides that
[11f such injunction is issued such employee may file a motion to dissolve
such injunction and a hearing upon such motion shall be held by the su-
perior court not later than three days after service of such motion upon
said board of education pursuant to an order of court or a judge thereof.
There have been nineteen teacher strikes in Connecticut during the past two years,
with fourteen injunctions, not one of which has been dissolved.
125. E.g., id.:
No certified professional employee shall, in an effort to effect a settlement
of any disagreement with his employing board of education, engage in any
stri'ke or concerted refusal to render services. This provision may be en-
forced . ..by an ex parte injunction.
126. E.g., New York's Taylor law provides that "[nio public employee or employee
organization shall engage in a strike, and no public employee or employee organization
shall cause, institute, encourage or condone a strike." N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAw § 210(l)
(McKinney Supp. 1969).
127. The following excerpts from the case of Helm v. Groton Educ. Ass'n, No. 37037
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(Sup. ,Ct. New London County, Conn. 1969), reflect the ease with which ex parte
injunctive relief has been obtained by boards of education in Connecticut:
THE COURT: How many primary schools are there?
THE WITNESS: [John L. Helm, Chairman of the Board of Education]:
Well, there are eighteen schools; one is a high school; three are junior highs,
and the rest are primary.
THE COURT: This covers all of them?
THE WITNESS: This covers all of them, yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: How many pupils?
THE WITNESS: I said nine thousand four hundred. We won't know,
of couise, until we have had a chance to count them.
THE WITNESS: Well, yesterday these gentlemen held a meeting, and
they passed a resolution in the meeting in which they stated they would not
report for work without a contract, and they told us-these are essentially
the last words that we had-they said, "We won't accept your offer. We
won't work without a contract."
THE COURT: What is the situation with-respect to the contract? Does
the contract provide that it should continue in effect until the-
MR. O'CONNOR: There are two contracts.
THE COURT: Do you have copies of them?
MR. O'CONNOR: I do not have copies of the contract with me this
morning, Your Honor. The contract does provide for conditions of em-
ployment as well as salary scales in the Groton situation. To my best
knowledge, we have resolved all matters except the salary scale.
THE COURT: I understand. Your answer to the argument is that they
will not work without a contract.
MR. O'CONNOR: They do have a contract because each of the individual
teachers, Your Honor, are under a tenure agreement. This Board of Edu-
cation is required to accept each of these teachers. We cannot discharge
them except for very special grounds.
THE COURT: Can they refuse to work?
MR. O'CONNOR: They have refused to work, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Can they refuse to work?
MR. O'CONNOR: They cannot refuse to work, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Without what? Without breaching their tenure agree-
ment
MR. O'CONNOR: Without breaching their tenure agreement; that's true.
THE COURT: What is the tenure agreement? Is that an individual
agreement? What does it provide?
MR. O'CONNOR: The tenure agreement is the individual agreement be-
tween the Board of Education and the individual teachers that sets out the
amount of money that he [sic] will receive in a given year.
THE COURT: What is the provision of the statute with respect to strikes
by teachers?
MR. O'CONNOR: It is Public Act 811, and the other one is 10-
THE COURT: Where is the specific provisions [sic] with respect to a
strike?
MR. O'CONNOR: I think it is right on top of that page, Your Honor.
There has been a change in the statute this year.
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The injunctions issued are often overly broad, vague orders to teach-
ers to refrain from striking or withholding services. 128 Courts are not
pleased by requests for clarification of these orders, even by teachers
willing to obey them but who expect that the injunction must make
some clear provision for running the school system. A few examples
of the detail needed in the court's decree, if it is to be truly effective,
include such major issues as the performance of non-academic duties;
payment for services rendered under the court order (by whom, when
and in what amount); the responsibility of teachers to administrative
personnel; the type of after school meetings required; and school days
and hours.
Where the court has maintained teachers in school under injunctive
command, teachers' organizations seem to be left with considerable re-
sponsibility for running the school system since they, not the school
administrators, must make the initial decisions as to what should be
done pursuant to the injunction. On the other hand, court interpreta-
tions of the scope of the injunction place the court in the position of
the school administrators. Discipline appears to deteriorate in any case
and there is inevitably disruption of the usual chain of command.
Plagued by questions such as whether teachers are required to attend
meetings after school hours, administrators find themselves in the un-
accustomed role of seeking the support of the teacher organization in
order to avoid the delays and expense entailed in securing specific court
orders.
It would hardly seem remiss to conclude that injunctive relief, couched
in sweeping language, is not particularly useful if the teachers attend
school but insist on specific court directives. The board of education,
faced with the loss of administrative control and a less than adequate
educational program, would probably prefer to settle teacher disputes
THE COURT: This is Section 4 of Public Act No. 811 of 1969 which
means this year. It seems clear enough. In other words, they refuse to
work.
MR. O'CONNOR: That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The injunction, temporary injunction, may issue. The
penalty is set at $500....
128. Mintz v. The Norwalk Teacher's Ass'n, (Sup. Ct. Fairfield County, Conn. 1969)
ordered the teachers to refrain from
a. Threatening to strike or striking, in an effort to effect settlement of
any existing dispute, including a salary dispute with the plaintiffs.
b. Threatening to enage in or engaging in any concerted refusal to render
services in an effort to effect a settlement of any dispute, including a salary
dispute, with the plaintiffs.
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on terms more favorable than were offered prior to the injunction. It
is suggested that school administrators, therefore, will probably not
find the injunction wholly satisfactory.
Injunctions: What's Ahead?
Some teacher organizations, unwilling to obey the court order, seek
to dissolve the injunction, or otherwise proceed under judicial decrees
substituted for school board policies. The resultant disobedience of
court orders has brought contempt sanctions of major magnitude.
Through March 30, 1971, according to an Associated Press tally, strik-
ing Newark teachers had been fined more than $200,000 (at the rate
of $7,500 for each day) and three union officers were sentenced to six
month terms for contempt.129
Without drastic reforms, the number of injunctions issued against
teachers, the number of contempt citations, and the number of teachers
jailed under such contempt citations can be expected to increase dra-
matically in the seventies. The ease with which injunctive relief has
been obtained in most states has undoubtedly had a debilitating effect
on impasse procedures such as mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration.
Strict application of traditional equitable concepts such as irreparable
harm and clean hands (good faith in the context of professional collec-
tive negotiations), and denial of injunctive relief where appropriate,
would seem in order pending corrective legislation.
Right to Strike: Constitutional Protection
Injunctions obtained by school boards in the face of a no contract-
no work position taken by the teachers have generally been attacked on
constitutional grounds. To date the arguments have failed.1 0 In the
absence of a contract, teachers have argued that an injunction ordering
them to refrain from withholding services violates the involuntary servi-
tude provisions of the thirteenth amendment.' 3 ' Acceptance of the
teachers' positon on involuntary servitude would, of course, recognize
their right to strike without limitation, a stance which no court has yet
been willing to take.
129. New London Day, March 30, 1971, at 18, col. 6.
130. See, e.g., City of Manchester v. Manchester Teacher's Guild, - N.H. -, 131
A.2d 59 (1957); City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance, Local 930, - R.I.
-, 141 A.2d 624 (1959).
131. See, e.g., School Dist. For City of Holland v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich.
314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
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A second argument against the constitutionality of injunctive relief
is that it deprives the teachers of fundamental rights guaranteed by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.132 The New York
Court of Appeals, in sustaining the constitutionality of the Taylor Law,
held that the fourteenth amendment'did not grant to any person an
absolute right to strike, and that the right is subject to the qualification
that a strike for an illegal purpose may be enjoined. 1 3
Recognition of a limited constitutional right to strike, would, like
strict application of equitable principles, provide a meaningful alterna-
tive to the automatic injunctive relief presently available in most states.
Presumably, injunctions would be available only upon a showing of a
clear and present danger to the well-being of the community. 3 4 No one
would seriously contend that the right to strike is absolute. But because
it involves fundamental liberties, the question of what overriding state
interest is to be protected arises. Does the mere fact that teachers
failed to teach for a few days justify the granting of affirmative relief
when viewed in the constitutional context of the right sought to be
exercised? It has been aptly stated:
132. See, City of New York v. DeLury, 23 N.Y.2d 175, 243 N.E.2d 128, 295 N.Y.S.2d
901 (1968), appeal dismissed, 384 U.S. 455 (1969).
133. Id. at 182, 243 N.E.2d at 131, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
134. In Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926), Justice Brandeis noted that while
there is no absolute right to strike the right is constitutionally protected, and -attempts
to curtail it will be scrutinized closely. Similarly, in Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp.
51 (D. Kans. 1945), appeal dismissed, 326 U.S. 690 (1945), the court recognized a
limited right to strike based on constitutional grounds and subject to abridgement only
upon a showing of clear and present danger to the community.
In the recent decision of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 39 U.S.L.W. 2565 (D.C. Cir.
March 31, 1971), Judge Wright, while concurring in the majority decision which
refused to recognize a right to strike by public employees noted:
It is by no means clear to me that the right to strike is not fundamental. The
right to strike seems intimately related to the right to form labor organi-
zations, a right which the majority recognizes as fundamental and which,
more importantly, is generally thought to be constitutionally protected
under the First Amendment-even for public employees. See Melton v. City.
of Atlanta, 39 LW 2469 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296
F. Supp. 1068, 37 LW 2517 (W.D.N.C. 1969) ..
Nevertheless, I feel that I must concur in the result reached by the majority
in . . .its opinion. As the majority indicates, the asserted right of public
employees to strike has often been litigated and, so far as I know, never
recognized as a matter of law. . . . If the right of public employees to
strike-with all its political and social ramifications-is to be recognized and
protected by the judiciary, it should be done by the Supreme Court which
has the power to reject established jurisprudence and the authority to en-
force such a sweeping rule.
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Schools are closed for Summer, Christmas, Easter and Thanks-
giving vacation, for football games, basketball tournaments, har-
vesting, teachers conventions, inclement weather, presidential visits
and for a host of other reasons without anyone getting excited
over the harm done to the children but if schools are closed for
one day as a result of a teachers' strike, the time lost supposedly
constitutes irreparable damage to them. Intellectually, this is not an
overwhelming argument. 135
Public employment does not automatically call for second-class treat-
ment.""' The effect of a strike by public employees and a determination
of the relief to be granted by the court should depend almost entirely
on the nature of the employment and its relationship in the circumstances
to the safety and well-being of the community. Government may have
an interest in prohibiting a strike by firemen or policemen that overrides
constitutional guarantees otherwise controlling. Significantly, however,
the janitorial staff of the local town hall occupies precisely the same
employment relationship as the police or fire officers, although the pub-
lic interest in a work stoppage is hardly identical.
There is no magic in starting the school year the week after Labor
Day. In most cases, the board could not show a "grave and immediate
danger to the community" which would override the exercise of free-
dom of speech, for example, by the teachers. At most, a work stoppage
would amount to a mere extension of the summer recess, without the
slightest jeopardy to completion of the school year. Admittedly, a strike
might continue over such a long period of time that the state's over-
riding interest would require the most extreme equitable remedies. At
that moment, however, a "grave and immediate danger to the com-
munity" would exist and hence, there would be no right to continue the
strike.
It is suggested, therefore, that a total prohibition on the right to col-
lectively refuse to render teaching services is overly broad. It is clear
that, even in those cases where disparate treatment between public and
private employees is justified, the state must draw its restrictions in
135. M. LEBERmAN & M. MOSKOW, CouncrrvE NEGOTIATIONS FOR TEcIUMas 299 (1966).
136. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), eliminates the claimed
distinction between public and private employment insofar as basic constitutional pro-
tections are concerned. The Keyisbian doctrine is simply stated: in order to justify
disparate treatment between public and private employees the result must be explainable
in terms of some overriding state need having the closest possible nexus to protection
of the essential functions of government. See also Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 Us.
493 (1967).
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terms sufficiently narrow to reach only that area legitimately entitled to
protection.3 7
Right to Strike: Statutory Protection
The blanket prohibition approach to strikes and work stoppages in
public education per se, with consequent restraint through injunctive
relief, has caused more problems than it has solved. Recognition of the
existing imbalance against teachers has been slow to come. However,
recent legislation in Hawaii,1as Vermont,'39 and Pennsylvania' 4° has
modified this approach.
Perhaps the most liberal legislation affecting public employee collec-
tive negotiations was passed by the Hawaii legislature in May of 1970.141
A public employment relations board consisting of two management,
two labor, and one public representative is established to carry out the
legislation.142 Refusal to bargain in good faith is defined as a prohibited
137. In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), the Supreme Court ruled uncon-
stitutional an Arkansas statute which required all teachers to file annually an affidavit
containing the names of all organizations to which they belong. The Court stated:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that even though the govern-
mental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement
must be reviewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same
basic purpose.
id. at 488.
138. HAwAI Rav. STAT. §§ 89-1, -20 (Supp. 1970).
139. VT. STAT. Ar. tit. 16, § 2010 (Supp. 1970) provides:
No restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction shall be granted
in any case brought with respect to any action taken by a representative
thereof in connection with or relating to pending or future negotiations,
except on the basis of findings of fact made by a court of competent juris-
diction after due hearing prior to the issuance of the restraining order or
injunction that the commencement or continuance of the action poses a
clear and present danger to a sound program of school education which in
the light of all relevant circumstances it is in the best public interest to pre-
vent. Any restraining order or injunction issued by a court as herein pro-
vided shall prohibit only a specific act or acts expressly determined in the
findings of fact to pose a clear and present danger.
140. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101, 1002 (Supp. 1970) provides:
If a strike by [teachers] occurs after the collective bargaining process ...
[has] been completely utilized and exhausted it shall, not be prohibited un-
less or until such a strike creates a clear and present danger or threat to
the health, safety, or welfare of the public.
141. HAwAiI REv. STAT. §§ 89-1, -20 (Supp. 1970).
142. Id. § 89-5.
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practice. 43 If both parties agree, an impasse may be submitted to final
and binding arbitration. 44 Mediation and fact-finding under the auspices
of the board are available in the case of impasse. 45  The most far
reaching feature of the act, however, is that it accords a conditional right
to strike to all public employees who are represented by an exclusive
bargaining representative. 146 As a condition to a strike, the employee
organization must submit the dispute to mediation and fact-finding.147
The statute also requires a sixty-day cooling-off period after the publi-
cation of a fact-finding award as well as the filing of a ten-day notice
of intent to strike. 48 Where a strike threatens public health or safety,
the state board will investigate an employer's petition and may set re-
quirements to avoid or remove such danger. 49 The Hawaii legislation
represents a realistic attempt to reconcile the conflicting interests in-
volved in public sector disputes. It may provide a format for national
legislation in the seventies.
TEACHER PROTECTION UNDER THE CIviL RIGHTS ACTS
Doubtlessly the seventies will witness a considerable increase in liti-
gation directed against school boards and their minions pursuant to the
civil rights acts.150 In the past two years teachers have won significant
victories as the application of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was ex-
tended to fact situations involving teachers' rights. The federal courts
have sustained teachers in the exercise of the constitutionally protected
rights of speech 52 and association, 5 ' and have required due process,
both substantive and procedural, of school boards in the employment
relationship with their teachers.1'"
In McLaugblin v. Tilendis,1'" non-tenure teachers were ordered rem-
143. Id. §§ 89-13 (a) (5), (b) (2).
144. Id. § 89-11(b).
145. Id.
146. Id. § 89-12(b).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. § 89-12 (c).
150. See generally C. ANrAu, FEDERAL CiVmI RIGlTs Act: Cmr. PRAcnCE (1971).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
152. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Los Angeles Teachers
Union v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 71 Cal.2d 551, 455 P.2d 827, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723
(1969)
153. See, e.g., Keyisluan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
154. See, e.g., Lucia v. D'uggan, 303 F Supp. 112 (D.Mass. 1969).
155. 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
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stated, after dismissal for conduct related to activity on behalf of a
teachers' organization. Significantly, in Keefe v. Geanakos,156 the First
Circuit not only protected the teacher's academic freedom (by extend-
ing to him the benefits of free speech in his classroom), but also found
a constitutional requirement that dismissal must be based on prior warn-
ings and founded on proof of violation of a specific regulation clearly
prohibiting the complained of conduct. Moreover, the dual remedies
of teacher reinstatement and money damages, under the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, were approved in Gouge v. Joht School District,157 against
the defense of school board immunity.
The seventies may witness one or more tests of state laws which cate-
gorically forbid teachers' strikes in every circumstance.' 58 Certainly
an application for injunctive relief'5 9 to restrain the enforcement of such
a state statute and the administrative orders of state and local boards
taken pursuant thereto will be made, possibly this summer or fall. It
would seem that the opportunity for success will be greatest in cases
where teachers have no signed annual employment agreements, are
without a contract, and have otherwise complied with all state laws re-
quiring good faith in collective negotiations, including exhaustion of the
established impasse procedures. The remedy by way of motion to dis-
solve a state court temporary injunction would not seem to be ade-
quate, 6° especially where an immediate appeal to the highest state court
cannot be had by reason of the failure of the lower court, or the school
board, to apply the provisions of the state's "little Norris-LaGuardia
act" to the case.' 6' In such instances, immediate resort to a three-judge
federal district court would be proper, and it would seem that a sub-
stantial federal question is necessarily involved.
Thus, teachers, absent effective labor legislation according protection
for the exercise of their constitutionally protected rights, have opened
new vistas in the federal courts. This positive movement will, no doubt,
continue. A sound national policy toward teacher-board relations can-
156. 418 F.2d 359 (lst Cir. 1969).
157. 310 F. Supp. 984 (WD. Wisc. 1970).
158. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 964(3) (1969).
159. An action for injunctive relief restraining the enforcement of a state statute
would require a three-judge district court panel. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
160. See, e.g., CoNx. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153e (Supp. 1970) and note 124 supra.
161. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-118 (1958) providing a speedy appeal to
the Supreme Court where injunctive relief is granted or denied in a case arising out
of a private sector labor dispute.
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not evolve solely from court decisions, however, and the recommenda-
tions made herein for legislative action are no less urgent.
SoME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SEVENTIES
Pending a national legislative solution, the judiciary must take an ap-
proach that it has been largely unwilling to take in the sixties. The anti-
teacher injunction has not proved a simple solution to a problem which,
unchecked, is growing increasingly more complex. The courts hereafter
must strictly apply recognized equitable principles, such as irreparable
harm and clean hands. Judicial recognition of a constitutionally based
limited right to a strike would also appear just. Moreover, it is only
reasonable for the courts to apply and extend civil rights legislation to
teachers in their relationships with school boards.
The judiciary, however, is not particularly well suited to solve the
complex problems discussed herein. There exists an urgent need for
legislation, national in scope. Such legislation must recognize teachers'
rights to engage in the determination of educational policy. All levels
of impasse resolution must provide for the imposition of sanctions on
any party not proceeding in good faith. Furthermore, the present im-
balance in favor of boards of education must be rectified by statutory
recognition of a right to strike by teachers who have in good faith ex-
hausted available administrative procedures. The right should be denied
only upon a showing of clear and present danger to the public health and
safety. In such cases, provision must be made for final resolution of the
dispute by binding arbitration before an impartial tribunal of full-time
experts in teacher-board relations. Funds should be provided for the
training of these personnel now and in the future.
While the need for national legislation is clear, a role may be pre-
served for those states seeking good faith solutions, as many have yet to
do, by providing exemptions for those states with legislation as extensive
as the federal law. Absent drastic change, we may see in the seventies
a total breakdown of our educational systems and a complete reversal
of the moderate gains made in the past half decade.
19711
